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One finds in Kierkegaard’s later literature (1846-55) a continuation of his 
earlier emphasis in the pseudonymous writings on ethics as the search for 
self-knowledge. This socratic principle is clearly a present and unifying theme 
in the pseudonymous literature, and Kierkegaard does not lose sight of this 
philosophical commitment in these later works. Here he continues to stress 
the search for self-knowledge as a subjective passion which receives its most 
exemplary expression in the ethico-religious form of life. But this second 
literature significantly deepens Kierkegaard’s preoccupation with self- 
knowledge by disclosing self-love as its essential motivation and the socio­
political context in which all self-love and self-knowledge take form.
Before looking more closely at the way in which this second literature 
expands the view of ethics developed in the pseudonymous works, it would be 
useful to remind ourselves of Kierkegaard’s three stages of human existence. 
The pseudonymous works developed a conception of human existence as 
composed of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages of life. The aesthetic 
stage is characterized by the desire for pleasure, the ethical by the obligation 
to become morally good, and the religious by the faith that one can with 
God’s help fulfill one’s moral obligation. The pseudonyms, who themselves 
are developed personalities, admirably portray the formal relations between 
pleasure, duty, and faith. They also succeed in existentially presenting these 
relations in a series of characters who are seized by dread and despair in their 
struggles to come to terms with the subjective dimension of the human self. 
Few philosophers in the history of western thought who have thoroughly as 
has Kierkegaard penetrated and exposed the complex terrain of human 
inwardness. Moreover, Kierkegaard has through his pseudonyms illuminated 
not only the texture of human inwardness but also its irreducibility. That is to 
say, the desire for pleasure, the demands of duty, and the promise of faith are 
ontologically constitutive of each individual subject, and the reconciling of 
these desires, obligations, and hopes is a task which each individual alone must
accomplish. This self, and the existential task which it poses are inescapably 
mine and mine alone. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard called attention to 
the irreducibility of the human qua individual, and the virtue of this 
achievement is its recognition of the character of human self.
But this conception of the human self developed by the pseudonyms is 
deficient in at least respects. First, they pay no attention to the ontological 
and the epistemological roles played by the other in the development of a 
concept of the self. The other is included neither in Kierkegaard's ontological 
analysis of the nature of the self nor in his analysis of the way in which 
individuals come to the knowledge of who and what they are. After having 
read the pseudonymous writings, one is left with the impression that the 
human other is not a necessary condition for either the existence of the self 
or for self-knowledge. This omission lends an abstract quality to Kierkegaard's 
conception of the self and leads to the charge that he had an atomistic view 
of the human self of the sort found in liberalism. The second deficiency in the 
pseudonymous literature is its lack of emphasis on the material conditions 
constituting the human self. Kierkegaard notes in Either ¡Or that the self is 
constituted by social, historical, economic, cultural, as well as biological and 
psychological factors, but it is an insight which he himself did not develop 
in these early writings. Moreover, these earlier works pay little attention to 
the social and political developments of his own Denmark in the nineteenth 
century. This neglecting of the material conditions constituting the human 
self and the social and political events occuring in his own life along with his 
failure to include the other in his ontology of the human self led some critics 
of the pseudonyms to conclude that Kierkegaard was an eccentric and isolated 
genius who was content to write for an equally isolated and, indeed, abstract 
individual who is exclusively concerned with his own private destiny. If left 
with only these early materials, the critic might well argue that Kierkegaard's 
irreducible inwardness is merely the psychological side of the alienated con­
sciousness produced by the liberalism of modern social and political thought.
Kierkegaard anticipated this sort of criticism. In a journal entry in which 
he comments on the publication of his Edifying Discourses, which accompanied 
the publication of his pseudonymous books, Kierkegaard wrote that his critics 
»will presumably bawl out that I do not know what comes next, that I know 
nothing about sociality. The fools! Yet on the other hand I owe it to myself 
to confess before God that in a certain sense there is some truth in it, only not
as men understand it, namely that always when I have first presented one 
aspect sharply and clearly, then I affirm the validity of the other even more 
strongly. Now I have the theme of the next book. It will be called Works of 
Love.«1 Here is Kierkegaard up to his dialectical mischief again. The concern 
with the individual leads dialectically to an equally strong concern for the 
social. The transition may not be as dialectically neat as Kierkegaard hints 
that it will be, but it is a clear and unmistakable move none the less. Not 
only Works of Love but also all of the second literature is concerned with 
precisely these deficiencies plaguing the pseudonymous literature. In this later 
literature, Kierkegaard’s ontology of the human self does take in a social 
dimension as does his epistemology. The self neither can exist nor know itself 
without the other. Thus, Kierkegaard’s struggle to come to terms with the 
nature of the human self continues in this later literature, though now the 
development of his thought is significantly informed by both the social and 
historical dimensions of human life.
Now if Kierkegaard broadens his conception of the human self and the 
quest for self-knowledge by placing both in a socio-historical context, he 
also broadens it by introducing self-love as the essential motivation of self- 
knowledge. Self-love and self-knowledge are essentially related in the sense 
that the former is a necessary condition of the latter. Self-love is the desire to 
become a concrete, identifiable, and worthy self, and the satisfaction of this 
desire requires a social and historical context. One cannot become a self 
independently of the other and of history. Indeed, human relations on both 
a private and a public scale and historical movements are most clearly under­
stood, Kierkegaard will argue, when they are construed in terms of the human 
self and its development toward concretion, identifiability, and a sense of 
worth. This desire, as we shall see, is similar to the desire for pleasure which 
is so thoroughly analyzed in the pseudonymous works as the heart of the 
aesthetic mode of existence. The ethical and religious task of life is portrayed 
not as transcending this desire but as mediating it by disclosing the necessarily 
moral and religious character of the desire’s satisfaction. In the later literature, 
the ethico-religious task is the same. How is self-love, or the desire to become 
a concrete, identifiable, and worthy self, to be ethically and religiously
1 Søren Kierkegaard’s Papirer, ed. P. A. H eiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting, 20  Vols., 
I -X I3 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1 9 0 9 -1 9 4 8 ), V i l l i  A 4.
mediated? In confronting this question, Kierkegaard accepts the unsurpass- 
ibility of self-love. One cannot not love oneself. He also recognizes the im­
possibility of loving oneself without directly implicating others. What Kierke­
gaard seems to have discovered in these later works is a social conception of 
human being based on the phenomenon of love. All human beings love 
themselves, and it is this self-love which casts us into relations with others. 
For without the other it is not possible to love oneself. The inescapability of 
self-love and the other as its necessary condition are the grounds for both 
selfish and unselfish self-love. Self-love is like pleasure. When pleasure is left 
to itself, it culminates in its own contradiction. The pseudonymous writers 
were anxious to convince their readers that the pursuit of pleasure which is 
unmediated by the ethico-religious mode of consciousness contradicts itself by 
culminating in despair. Now Kierkegaard will try to convince his reader that 
self-love, which is not mediated by an ethico-religious modes of consciousness, 
will culminate in selfishness. And a selfish self-love is a contradiction in the 
sense that one who selfishly loves himself can never actually become the 
concrete, identifiable, and worthy self which he desires to become. Selfish self- 
love is self-defeating, because it legislates the existence of a world characterized 
by conflict, manipulation and envy. And to exist in such a world is to exist 
in a manner which contradicts the natural end (telos) of self-love. Kierkegaard 
follows Kant in arguing that only when one wills all selves as ends is it 
possible for one to become the self one desires to become. Proper self-love is 
a love for all as one loves oneself, and it is only in this manner that the 
natural end of self-love can ever be actualized. The transformation of selfish 
self-love by the recognition of one's moral obligations and religious hopes is 
the only way in which the natural telos of self-love can ever be actualized. 
Kierkegaards transition to the social and the historical in this second liter­
ature, then, places aesthetic desire, moral obligation, and religious faith in 
a living and concrete situation. Yes, it is true to say that these are the ir­
reducible dimensions of the human self. But one must also say that the self 
always desires something particular, is always obligated to will specific and 
concrete ends, and also hopes for the realization of those same ends. Thus, 
Kierkegaard places his conception of the dialectical development of selfhood 
in a concrete social and historical situation which makes concrete and specific 
human desires, obligation, and hope.
In this paper, we shall examine Kierkegaard’s conception of selfish self-
love. This analysis will lead us to a consideration of both its private and 
public forms as well as to an exploration of the psychology generated by 
selfish self-love. We shall be compelled by a consideration of time to stop 
short of a discussion of Kierkegaards ethico-religious solution to the problem 
of selfish self-love. Such an investigation must be taken up at another time.
The Natural Self
In Kierkegaard’s discussion of the human situation in his second literature 
one of the terms most frequently used to describe human beings is “natural 
man”. This term consistently appears in most of the important published 
works during this period as well as in his journal.2 One finds in most of these 
references to the “natural man” the notion of human beings state as selfish. 
Kierkegaard believes that “natural qualifications” like human “drives and 
inclinations” are always selfish.3 Indeed “naturally, there is nothing a man 
clings to so tight as to his selfishness -  which he clings to with his whole 
self.”4 This passage correctly reflects Kierkegaard’s suspicion that there is 
little if anything undertaken by the natural man which is not tainted by the 
perversity of selfishness. Kierkegaard, like Aristotle, whom he follows closely 
on this point, relates the problem of selfishness to the issue of self-love.5 
The natural self is one “who loves himself selfishly”6 and Kierkegaard would
2 Søren Kierkegaard, Attack Upon *Christendom\ trans, w ith an intro, by W alter Lowrie 
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1944), pp. 122, 128, 150, 158.
Søren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, trans, w ith an intro, by W alter Lowrie (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 179 f.
Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves, trans, w ith  an intro, 
and notes by W alter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 1 1 3 -1 5 , 
119,  121.
Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. Howard V. H ong and Edna H. 
H ong, 4  V ols., (Bloom ington: Indiana University Press, 1 9 6 7 -7 5 ), I, 330, 507; II, 1823, 
1943; III, 2902 , 2908 , 2919 , 2970 , 3031, 3224, 3317, 3681, 3779; IV, 4349 , 4360 , 
4 690 , 4 7 11 , 4798 , 4885 , 5031.
3 SKJP, IV, 4447 .
4  FSE, p. 97. Cf. Ibid., p. 19.
5 Kierkegaard approvingly refers to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, IX , 7 and IX , 9 in  
his discussion of selfishness. T hough he does not m ention N E , IX , 8, it is obvious that 
he depends upon this chapter as w ell in his analysis o f selfish self-love in  SKJP, III, 
2441. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, trans. W . D . Ross in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 
ed. w ith an intro, by Richard M cKeon (N ew  York: Random House, 1941).
6 TC, p. 119.
agree with Aristotle that such persons are those who “assign to themselves 
the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily pleasures .. .  [and] gratify 
their appetities and in general their feelings and the irrational element of the 
soul. .. .“7 But for Kierkegaard an equally serious form of selfish self-love 
is rooted not in greed, as these passages suggest, but in power. The more 
perverse form of selfish self-love is that love which appears or masquarades as 
love for another but is in reality the overpowering of this other for one’s own 
ends. Kierkegaard asserts that “what we men extol under the name of love is 
selfishness. .. .“8 Natural qualifications like “human drives” and “inclinations” 
are directed not only at the possession of physical and social objects such as 
food, shelter, money and fame but also, and more fundamentally when 
disguised as genuine love, at the possession of other persons.
Kierkegaard claims an allegiance to Aristotle in his observation that most 
expressions of love are, in fact, expressions of selfish self-love.9 And he relies 
heavily on Aristotle in accounting for how such a phenomenon is possible. 
In the NE, Aristotle argues that craftsmen and poets love their handiwork 
and poems more than they would love their producers if they were to come 
alive.10 This is true also of benefactors who love those whom they have helped 
more than the benefitted love their benefactors. “The cause of this,” explains 
Aristotle, “is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and lived, and 
that we exist by virtue of activity (i. e., by living and acting), and that the 
handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity; he loves his handiwork, 
therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of 
things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity.”11 
Aristotle here argues that the actualization of oneself in the object of one’s 
activity is pleasant.12 Furthermore, he claims that “love is an activity”13 so 
that an object of love is loved because it represents the lover as actualized. 
It is therefore improper to draw a sharp ontological distinction between the
7 NE, IX , 8.
8 FSE, p. 102. Cf. “For love precisely is one of the strongest and deepest expressions of 
selfishness.” Ibid., p. 97.
9 SKJP, III, 2441.
10 NE, IX , 7.
11 NE, IX , 7. Aristotle’s italics.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
actor and the acted upon, the producer and the product, the lover and the 
beloved.14
Kierkegaard sees in Aristotle’s observations about some forms of love a 
principle governing the behavior of the natural man. Love within nature is a 
mode of self-production through which each individual attempts to pass from 
a state of potentiality to one of actuality by creating himself and in through 
the other. In Kierkegaard’s words, “To be specific, he who has produced 
something loves it more than the production loves him. Why is this? Because 
there is more ‘being’, more egotism, in the first relationship than in the second, 
because author-love is the highest egotism. . . .  This whole chapter by Aristotle 
is very valuable.”15 The chapter is obviously a valuable one for Kierkegaard, 
although he draws an inference from its content which it is not clear that 
Aristotle would draw. Aristotle says that “activity” is pleasureable, but Kierke­
gaard claims that the activity is also selfishness.16 Kierkegaard believes that 
“activity” is selfish because “what is sought is not the other’s good, or not that 
alone,”17 but essentially one’s own transition from possibility to actuality 
through action upon another. The self becomes an actual and concrete being 
through its actions. Kierkegaard agrees with Aristotle that the self’s handiwork 
is the “producer in activity”. It is mistaken to distinguish ontologically the 
subject and the object acted upon by the subject. Now Kierkegaard extends 
this principle into the domain of human relationships in order to show that 
such relationships, when grounded in nature, are expressions of selfish self- 
love (egotism). The self is a being which is in the process of becoming and 
in the realm of nature one finds that this becoming self exploits other selves 
in its quest to be. This struggle to become a self within nature occurs in both 
the private and public spheres of human life. The natural man’s egotism is as 
operative in the public and political dimensions of human life as it is in 
the private.18
14 Ibid.
15 SKJP, III, 2441.
16 Aristotle discusses selfish self-love in NE, IX , 8 and there relates it to greed.
17 FSE, p. 103.
18 The distinction between private and public is here loosely drawn to designate relations 
between individuals as opposed to relations between groups of indviduals. It is recognized 
that public as w ell as private relations in the above sense may be political since both  
invole power, but in this paper, I shall confine the use of the term “political” to 
discussions of relations am ong groups of individuals.
The Natural Self in Private Relations
One finds Kierkegaard's discussion of egotism in the private sphere of life 
most thoroughly developed in Works of Love. In Works of Love and else­
where, Kierkegaard identifies a number of concrete relations between 
individuals as expressions of egotism. The list of examples includes maternal 
love,19 relations based on admiration,20 ownership of property,21 marriage22 
sacrificial love,23 paternal love24 the religious relation between God and the 
individual,25 sexual relations (eros) 26 and friendship 27 Only eros and friend­
ship however receive extended analysis in Works of Love, although it is clear 
that the arguments against eros and friendship af modes of egotism apply 
equally to the other members of this list. Indeed, it is clear that for Kierke­
gaard all private relations, whatever their forms, are subject to the contagion 
of egotism. The analysis, then, of friendship and eros must be considered 
merely as an illustration of the egotism obtained in all natural relations 
between individuals.
Now in discussing both these forms of love in Works of Love, Kierkegaard 
resorts to a conceptual framework which he has already used in earlier works 
to illuminate the nature of self-consciousness, freedom, anxiety, and despair. 
Kierkegaard writes that “in erotic love the I is qualified as body -  psyche -  
spirit, the beloved qualified as body -  psyche — spirit. In friendship the I is 
qualified as psyche -  spirit and the friend is qualified as psyche -  spirit. Only 
in love to one’s neighbour is the self, which loves, spiritually qualified simply 
as spirit and his neighbour as purely spiritual.”28 Without here getting into 
a long discussion about the meaning of these terms in Kierkegaard’s writings, 
it is sufficient to say that human relations which are not essentially spiritual 
in nature but are instead essentially sensuous or physical are relations which
19 SKJP, III, 2412 , 2425.
2 0  Ibid., I, 974.
21 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard V. H ong and Edna H. H ong (N ew  
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 248  ff.
22 SKJP, III, 2412.
23 Ibid.
2 4  Ibid.
25 AC, pp. 150, 191, 221 f.
26  WL, passim.
27 Ibid.
28 Those familiar w ith Kierkegaard’s earlier works w ill recognize these three terms as the 
one he uses in the developm ent of his concept of the self.
are grounded in what Kierkegaard calls “natural determinants (tendencies and 
characteristics).”29 Eros and friendship are by definition naturally determined 
and when the individual does not exist as spirit, they are only modes of im­
mediacy. As such, both are spontaneous, preferential, and accidental in nature. 
Their spontaneous character results from their existing prior to that mode of 
reflection which leads to self-consciousness. That is to say, individuals whose 
responses of love to others are essentially spontaneous are motivated in part 
by impulses of which they are not conscious, and as such they are both 
unaware and uncritical of the impulses and the behavior they motivate. 
Neither requires reflection in this sense as a necessary condition for existing. 
Eros and friendship are accidental in the sense that they are in part “de­
termined by the object.”30 Certain features and qualities of the other are in 
part determinative of eros and friendship. Clearly, erotic and friendly affections 
are partially stimulated by the other. It is also the case that the lover and 
friend prefer31 certain features and qualities to others so that the beloved and 
the befriended are preferred to the exclusion of others. The very nature of 
these modes of loving include, then, spontaneity, exclusivity 32 and preferent- 
iality. It is in this sense that both are by nature modes of immediacy. The 
immediate individual is one who is not self-reflective and as such exists in 
relations which are by definition spontaneous, exclusive, and preferential. 
When one allows these qualities to govern ones social relations, they become 
essentially immediate in nature.
Kierkegaard observes throughout Works of Love that these immediate 
social relations have been praised by poets and philosophers as the epitome 
of goodness and fulfillment in human relations, although he does in the least 
share their enthusiasm; for, in his view, eros and friendship as immediate 
phenomena are nothing more than disguised forms of selfish self-love. “Self- 
love, egocentricity, is sensuality.“33 “In [erotic] love and friendship one’s 
neighbour is not loved but ones self, or the first I once again, but more in­
29  WL, p. 68. Cf. Ibid., p. 65.
30 Ibid., p. 77. Cf. SKJP, III, 2449.
31 Kierkegaard writes that “erotic love and friendship are preferential and the passion of  
preference.” WL, p. 65.
32 WL, pp. 62 ff.
33 Ibid., p. 65.
tensely.”34 And, finally, in eros and friendship, self-love “selfishly . . .  unite[s] 
the two in a new selfish self.”35
This selfish self-love is not simple greed or a crude narcissistic infatuation 
with one’s own body and feelings but is dialectially conceived as the narciss­
istic infatuation with the other in whom one sees oneself. Thus, “the one 
whom self-love in the strictest sense loves is also basically the other-I, for 
the other-I is oneself, and this is indeed self-love.36 For Kierkegaard, eros and 
friendship are trapped in this pessimistic scenario of self-seeking. Even the 
commitment of “devotion” and the feeling of “boundless abandonment” 
toward the other are self-deceptions since they too are disguished modes of 
self-constitution in and through the other.37
Kierkegaard’s analysis of the ways in which love can be a mode of self­
constitution is not as developed as one would like. His own reflections at this 
point are ambiguous and suggest at least two ways in which the other may be 
related to as a means to the end of becoming a self. First, the relation between 
the lover and the beloved is compared, as we have noticed above, to the 
relation between creator and created. The beloved is like a creation in the 
sense that he is something which the lover forms, shapes, fashions, brings into 
being so that he is an expression of the lover. The beloved is a product of the 
lover so that the beloved becomes the lover in the Aristotelean sense of the 
self’s becoming.38 Kierkegaard, as we have already noticed, agrees with 
Aristotle’s claim that when the lover is related to the beloved as creator to 
product, the lover loves the beloved more than the beloved loves the lover. 
This is so, Kierkegaard asserts, because “there is more ‘being’ . . .  in the first 
relation than in the second. .. .”39 The lover loves himself only when he is 
something to love. In objects which he creates, he becomes a real, tangible, 
identifiable thing. In love, the lover ceases to be merely a possibility, an
34 Ibid., p. 69.
35 Ibid., pp. 6 8 -9 . Cf. “But fa lling  in love is self-love; erotic love is self-love. In erotic 
love I keep m y own idea of what is lovable and find that the object com pletely suits 
m y head and my heart; this is why I love the beloved so ardently -  that is, I ardently 
love m yself.’’ SKJP, II, 1411.
36 Ibid., p. 69. Cf. “T he beloved are . . .  called, remarkably and significantly enough, the 
other-self . . .  But wherein lies self-love? It lies in the I, in the self. W ould  not self-love 
then, still remain in loving the other-self, the other I?” WL, p. 66. Kierkegaard's italics.
37 Ibid., p. 67.
38 NE, IX , 7.
39 SKJP, III, 2441.
imaginative reality, a mere image in his own mind, On this view, the in­
dividual becomes a concrete, identifiable and worthy self in the transition 
from possibility to actuality in and through the beloved.
Departing from his discussion of eros and friendship, Kierkegaard describes 
the person who seeks to create himself through the domination of others as 
one who is utterly incapable of genuine love. Such persons who use eros and 
friendship as disguised modes of self-assertion do not love the other at all, for 
“only true love loves every man according to his own individuality .The strong, 
the domineering person lacks flexibility, and he lacks a sense of awareness 
of others; he demands his own with everyone; he wills that everyone shall be 
recreated in his image, be trimmed according to his pattern for human 
beings. . . .  If the strong and domineering individual cannot create, he wants 
at least to remodel; he seeks his own so that wherever he points he can say: 
see, this is my image, this is my ideal, this is my will. Whether the strong and 
domineering individual is allotted a great sphere of activity or a small one, 
whether he is a tyrant in an empire or a house-tyrant in a little attic room, 
the essence is the same: domineeringly unwilling to go out of himself, 
domineeringly wanting to crush the other person's individuality or make life 
miserable for him."40 For those persons lacking the internal resilience to assert 
themselves over others, there is the possibility of identifying with a larger 
group of people through which one collectively accomplishes the same goal 
of self-constitution. Kierkegaard identifies the weak as those who band 
together in groups to attain for themselves what they cannot acquire in­
dividually.41
But there are other passages in Works of Love42 which suggest a second 
mode of self-constitution through a relation of love. These passages come very 
close to Sartre’s analysis of love in Being and Nothingness where he argues 
that to love is to want to be loved.43 This definition of love does not mean 
that the lover in addition to loving the beloved also wants to be loved. On 
the contrary, Sartre means by this phrase that loving is nothing more than 
wanting to be loved. In this case, the lover becomes a concrete and identifiable
40  WL, pp. 2 5 2 -5 3 .
41 This m ode of self-constitution w ill be discussed below in the section entitled “The
Natural Self in Public Relations.”
42 WL, p. 69.
43 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (N ew  York: W ashington
Square Press, 1968), pp. 4 7 4 -8 4 .
self not through acting on the beloved but by being acted upon by the be­
loved. The characters Garcin and Estelle in Sartre’s “No Exit”u  are illustra­
tions of this analysis of love in Being and Nothingness. Garcin understands 
that his role in the French Resistance and his attempted flight to Mexico in 
order to start a resistance newspaper cannot be an act of heroism unless it is 
so construed by someone else. Garcin cannot decide whether his effort to 
leave France, resulting in his arrest for desertion, was an act of cowardice or 
courage. He acts as though the only way in which the ambiguity can be 
resolved is for someone to regard him as a hero. He seeks this esteem first in 
Estelle whom he subsequently abandons because he suspects her motives for 
cooperating with him. Later Garcin decides that it is the lesbian Inez whom 
he will approach since her acknowledgement of him as heroic would not be 
sexually motivated. The case is the same with Estelle who understands that 
she cannot be desirable unless she is desired; she therefore seeks the coopera­
tion of Garcin in becoming a self which is sexually attractive and appealing. 
Both Garcin and Estelle in this play require another person in order to 
become a concrete and identifiable self. Sartre’s version of the social con­
stitution of human selfhood is the basis of his own version of the war of all 
against all.
In this type of selfish self-love the lover is not an active agent, as in the 
first case, but a passive object desiring only to be acted upon by the beloved. 
In this case, the lover wants to become a concrete and identifiable self through 
the agency of the beloved.4 5 Kierkegaard quite correctly sees that this mode 
of self-love leads in the direction of self-deification in the sense that the lover 
desires ultimately nothing less than to become the center of the beloved's 
life.46 The lover wants to become, in Sartre’s terms, the beloved’s “project”. 
Put another way, the lover wants to become the beloved’s absolute. All actions 
and values are then decided upon with reference to this center of one’s world 
in which case the lover becomes a god in the eyes of the beloved.
In personal relations, we discover not a battle growing out of the impulse 
to survive but, more fundamentally, a battle for oneself growing out of the 
impulse to self-constitution. In the use of the other, one comes to an awareness
44  Jean-Paul Sartre, “N o  Exit,” trans. Stuart Gilbert (N ew  York: Random House, 1946).
45 WL, p. 69.
46  Ibid.
of oneself as somebody, as an identity which stands out from all other things, 
as ontologically distinct, unique, and worthy. One sees in eros and friendship 
the “natural tendency” to reach out, dominate, and order all things in the 
basic interest of one’s own self-constitution. This is a disturbing claim. To 
make this point, he selects the seemingly most benign and gracious of all 
social relations, eros and friendship, to expose the basic egocentricity of all 
human selves.47
Thus far in this discussion of Kierkegaard’s conception of the natural self, 
we have seen emerging three constituent elements of all immediate relations 
between individuals. First, the individual in an immediate social relation is 
not self-conscious. That is to say, the individual is lacking in a full awareness 
of the nature of his own self and mistakenly views himself in and through the 
other. Both social relations are devoid of what Kierkegaard calls spirit and are 
therefore incomplete expressions of oneself. Second, we have seen how in the 
state of immediacy all relations of love are attempts at self-constitution. The 
other is required in the emergence of the individual as a human self. So in 
this state of nature, we discover the social nature of human selfhood. Third, 
we have seen that immediacy, though social in nature, is also a state of con­
flict. The social fabric of immediacy is one of struggling for power over the 
other in the pursuit of one’s own self-identity. Immediacy is painfully para­
doxical: We cannot be without the other, yet the other is the greatest possible 
threat to achieving success in one’s struggle to be. Self-love which is selfish 
generates conflict in that each individual who loves himself selfishly relates 
to the other as a means to the end of becoming a concrete and identifiable self.
The Natural Self in Public Relations
The private relation is not the only arena in which the egotism of the natural 
self asserts itself. Kierkegaard observed the presence of egotism in property
47 It is important to state explicitly that Kierkegaard makes a distinction between egotism  
and all forms o f love including eros and friendship. The different forms of love are not 
essentially evil. They are merely the victims o f  the natural self’s inclination to attempt 
to become a self through the possesion o f another person. This possession frequently 
takes the m isleading form of love which leads Kierkegaard to conclude that in most 
instances, love is a deception in the sense that lovers, friends and parents for example, 
deceive themselves in fa iling  to see that their own interests and needs dom inate these 
relations. In Kierkegaard’s view , eros and friendship are life ’s greatest fortune. (WL, 
p. 249 .) The issue is how  to preserve them  from the contamination o f egotism.
and class relations as well. And as the egotism of private relations is often 
disguised as love, the egotism in public relations is often disguised as political 
activity ostensibly committed to the dissolution of human poverty and power­
lessness. The struggle for property and power were also in Kierkegaard’s view 
essentially a struggle for self-identity. In his discussion of the anxiety which 
accompanies ones social, economic, and political status,48 one sees clearly 
Kierkegaard’s perception of the spiritual character of human conflict in the 
public dimensions of human life.
Human beings in their natural state, unlike other species of living things, 
require “the other” in order to be. We have already seen how this is the case 
in private relations. Now we have Kierkegaard appealing to the same prin­
ciple in his analysis of class relations. Describing man in his natural state, 
Kierkegaard claims that “in order to be himself, a man must first be expertly 
informed about what the others are, and thereby learn to know what he 
himself is -  in order then to be that.”49 Given the impossibility of being 
human without the other, “it seems as though he must constantly wait for the 
others in order to learn to know what he is now, at this moment.”50 Existing 
for the natural self “lies in existing only before others, in not knowing of 
anything else but the relationship to others.”51 Therefore, “he is what the 
others make of him, and what he makes of himself by only being for others.”52
This self-determination which is based on one’s reference to others is no 
less a reality in public than in private human relationships. The complicated 
network of collective and public relations established in the economic, 
political, social, and cultural arenas of life may also become the media through 
which individuals seek to establish themselves as concrete, identifiable, and 
worthy selves. In these cases, the human concretion which becomes desirable 
as the source of identity and worth may include a variety of different 
phenomena. It may be, for example, that money, race, cultural heritage, or 
sexuality becomes the identifying and valuing distinction. In any case, conflict 
between groups is based on the struggle either to maintain the valuable 
phenomenon, e. g., money, or the phenomenon as valuable, e. g., sexuality or
48  CD, pp. 5 -9 4 .
49  Ibid., p. 42.
50 Ibid., p. 43.
51 Ibid., p. 44.
52 Ibid., p. 47.
race, in order to maintain one’s view of oneself as being concrete and worthy. 
Any opposition which seeks to deprive one of the valuable phenomenon or 
the phenomenon as valuable is resisted and, if necessary, destroyed. Coercion 
is an essential ingredient of human relationships within nature, for it becomes 
necessary at times to resist forcibly those who would deprive one of that 
which identifies one as a concrete and worthy being.
In Christian Discourses, Kierkegaard analyzes this conflict between groups 
as class conflict based on the struggle for economic and political power. 
In these discourses, Kierkegaard’s analysis of class conflict does not settle on 
the economic and political dimensions of such conflict but on the spiritual 
nature of the tension. Class conflict is an essential feature of all natural human 
relations, because it rises out of the struggle for identity. While it is true that 
economic and political issues are genuinely at stake in class conflict Kierke­
gaard sees underlying these tangible struggles a more fundamental struggle 
for human self-identity. Since one’s identity is dialectically constituted in 
relation to the other, the conflict between classes is essentially nothing less 
than a conflict generated by the struggle to be a concrete, identifiable, and 
valuable self. In fact, it is from Kierkegaard’s perspective mistaken to 
distinguish the struggle for political and economic power from the spiritual 
struggle to become a self. Since all natural human relations are egotistical, 
political and economic power becomes the means whereby members of the 
ruling class establish their identity through the domination of the lower class. 
Moreover, “the lowly man ...  sinks under the prodigious weight of com­
parison which he lays upon himfelf.“53 He is “tortured by the thought of 
being nothing, tortured by the fruitlessness of his efforts to be something.”54 
His “anxiety is to become something in the world. .. .  To be [simply] a man 
.. .  is not to be anything -  that is in fact to be nothing, for in this there is no 
distinction from nor advantage over all men. .. .  But to be Councillor of 
Justice -  that would be something. .. .”55
To have power is to be something; to be powerless is to be nothing. And 
since one cannot be powerful unless there is powerlessness one must have the 
other qua powerless in order to be. Maintaining these class distinctions
53 Ibid., p. 48.
54 Ibid. Kierkegaard’s italics.
55 Ibid., p. 47.
between the powerful and the powerless, the wealthy and the poor, is essential 
for the natural self if there is to exist any possibility of gaining identity, being, 
in the world. Thus, it is not ironic for members of the lower class to cling to 
the system which suppresses them, for without it there would be no chance 
of ever becoming a concrete, identifiable, and valuable self. Thus, the lowly 
man »desires to belong to the temporal . . .  he will not let it go, he clings 
tighter to being nothing, tighter and tighter as he seeks in vain to be some­
thing. . . .”56
The lowly man clings to a social, economic, and political system which 
requires class distinctions, because it offers him the possibility of becoming a 
self. Likewise, the high man clings to the same system, for it is the source of 
his being as well. While the low man’s anxiety is that he is nothing, the high 
man’s anxiety is that he will become nothing. The anxiety of highness is the 
fear that one will lose one’s being through the loss of class position.57 It is 
clear, then, that this dialectical constitution of selfhood is not only conceptually 
grasped by the thinker but also is directly experienced by all human beings 
as fear of the other and as anxiety about one’s own identity or being. The 
high man, for example, “secures himself in every way, since he describes 
danger everywhere, plots everywhere, envy everywhere. .. ,“58 His fear of the 
other is anxiety over himself. The loss of class identity is self-dissolution. 
Since class identity and being are essentially related, one requires the other 
in order to be, and yet the other is the greatest possible threat to one’s be­
coming a concrete self within the realm of immediacy.
While this struggle for identity may be carried out publically in the struggle 
for economic and political power, it may also be present in social and cultural 
conflict. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard describes as “small-minded” those 
persons who band together and prejudically exclude all those who do not 
share in some common trait or characteristic which they regard as peculiarly 
distinguishing. “Small-mindness has fastened itself tightly to a very particular 
shape and form which it calls its own; only this does it seek, and only this can 
it love. If small-mindedness finds this, then it loves. Thereby small-mindedness 
sticks together with small-mindedness; they grow together like an ingrown
56 Ibid., p. 48.
57 Ibid., p. 60.
58 Ibid.
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nail, and spiritually speaking it is just as bad. This association of small- 
mindedness is then praised as the highest love, as true friendship, as true, 
steadfast, sincere harmony.”59 Such prejudical and cowardly small-mindedness 
“feels . . .  a damp, unpleasant anxiety upon observing another person’s in­
dividuality and nothing is more important than to get rid of it.“60 All those 
not possessing this trait or characteristic are excluded yet feared for their 
individuality stands as a constant threat to the identifying and valuing trait of 
such a closed society.
This tension is forcefully illustrated in Flannery O’Connor’s excellent short 
story, “Every Thing That Rises Must Converge”.61 the story takes place on a 
bus in a small town in the deep south. Its two main characters include a 
lower middle class white woman, who is middle aged and fiercely proud of 
her southern aristocratic heritage, and her one son, Julian, who has just 
graduated from a small southern college and is presently selling typewriters 
until he can launch a writing career. The main portion of the story occurs as 
the two are riding to the downtown YWCA where Julian’s mother plans to 
attend her weekly weight reducing class. At a stop, the bus is boarded by a 
black woman and her young four-year-old son who immediately attracts 
Julian’s mother’s attention. Throughout the remainder of the bus ride, Julian’s 
mother makes gratuitous and condescending gestures of the sort that one 
makes to an inferior. She smiles condescendingly and plays peek-a-boo with 
this “cute” black child. These patronizing gestures continue as they get off 
the bus when Julian’s mother gives the young boy a “shiny new penny”. The 
black mother’s rage which has been slowly building throughout the bus ride 
finally erupts, with a slap across the white woman’s face. She then grabs her 
son’s hand and storms down the sidewalk leaving Julian’s mother dazed and 
sprawled on the ground.
Julian accepts this violent reproach as a lesson justly deserved. “He saw 
no reason to let the lesson she had had go without backing it up with an 
explanation of its meaning. She might as well be made to understand what 
had happened to her. ‘Don’t think that was just an uppity Negro woman,’ he
59 WL, p. 254.
60 Ibid.
61 Flannery O ’Connor, Everything That Rises Must Converge (N ew  York: Farrar, Strauss 
and Girous, 1965).
said. ‘That was the whole colored race which will no longer take your con­
descending pennies. . . .  What all this means/ he said, ‘is that the old world 
is gone.”’62 His remonstrance at the end of the story, “you aren't who you 
think you are/'63 is a direct attack on her claim throughout the story that she 
knows who she is. Their conversation up to the encounter with the black 
woman is laced with his mothers assurances that she knows who she is. It is 
clear that her self-concept is linked with her white heritage which requires 
the continuing servitude of the blacks. That the blacks will no longer allow 
Julian’s mother this self-concept is symbolized by the black woman’s attack 
on her at the bus stop. The story ends with O’Connor’s description of her face 
as “fiercely distorted” beyond recognition symbolizing her own loss of identity 
in the black woman’s defiance.” “Julian,” O’Connor writes, “was looking into 
a face he has never seen before.”64 The black woman’s violence had left Julian’s 
mother without a recognizable identity. Self-consciousness and class conscious­
ness were indistinguishable in the sense that her entire being was predicated on 
the subjugation of the black. The black woman’s denial of this social arrange­
ment constituted nothing less than the denial of white identity. Moreover, 
O’Connor portrays this social arrangement as one of “innocence”, as “natural” 
as breathing. Only Julian, who had been away to college and had gained a 
critical reflective distance on his own heritage, was able to understand and 
criticize the black-white relation as it had developed in the history of the 
South. The story forcefully conveys Kierkegaard’s notion of the spiritual 
ground of cultural and class conflict in its portrayal of Julian's mother as one 
who “naturally” and “innoncently” builds an identity in and through the 
subjugation of the black.
It is important to notice that this example is not intended to convey the 
understanding that egotism is present only in extreme and dramatic situations 
involving prejudice and exploitation. It is Kierkegaard’s view that all group 
relations within immediacy are essentially governed by this self-seeking prin­
ciple. So subtle are these relations at times that it is not always possible to 
see the egotism that it so clearly apparent in O’Connor’s short story. In Kierke­
gaard’s view, all group conflict within immediacy has egotism as its; chief
62 Ibid., p. 21.
63 Ibid., p. 22.
64  Ibid.
motivating principle even though such conflict may appear in political, 
economic, and cultural terms. This is not to suggest that the conflict as it 
appears is an unreal one. It is only to imply that one does not get to the root 
of such conflict until it has been construed in terms of egotism.
Conclusion
It should be evident by now that it would be mistaken to believe that Kier­
kegaard’s term “natural man” refers to some a-historical or a-social state of 
nature in which human beings exist independently of history and social 
structures. As is apparent, the natural man is one who may exist in varying 
sorts of social structures but is necessarily social. There can be no such thing 
as an a-social state of human existence for Kierkegaard since by definition 
man is a social animal. To exist in a natural state or in a state of nature for 
Kierkegaard implies a social mode of existing. Indeed, the existence of what 
Kierkegaard calls the natural man requires the existence of the other. So 
closely aligned are the natural man and social existence that one cannot exist 
without the other. Thus, the state of nature is necessarily social in character. 
We can see more clearly that the excessively abstract character of the self as 
developed in the pseudonymous writings is significantly altered in the later 
literature. Here Kierkegaard argues that the self cannot be conceived in­
dependently either of the other or of the concrete and material conditions 
constituting the individual’s historical situation. It is important to close this 
paper with the observations that the social character of selfhood informs 
Kierkegaard’s conception not only of the natural but also the ethico-religious 
self. But there is not time to pursue further this aspect of Kierkegaard’s later 
thought.
